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NOTES.
ANTI-TRUST AcT-COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-

In i9o2, five companies producing over eighty-five per cent. of all
the harvesting machinery sold in the United States sold their plants
and property to the International Harvester Company, which was
organized with a total capital of $120,000,000, in return for stock of
the new company.' Later another company was acquired and the
companies thus combined manufactured a still greater percentage
of the harvesting machinery used in the United States and nearly
the whole of that exported. Prior to consolidation, these companies
were in keen competition for trade. The result of the combination
was to eliminate all the competition. The District Court in United
States v. International Harvester Company2 dissolved this corporation, declaring that it was illegal and violated the Sherman Act of
i89o. The court held that the statute must be construed in the light
'For a clear illustration of the usual method of forming such companies,

see 16 HARv. L. P_ 85 (1902).

'214 Fed. Rep. 987 (1914).

(3 1.5)
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of reason, that is, there is no possibility of frustrating it by resorting
to any disguise or subterfuge of form; that this combination was
in restraint of trade, because it substantially suppressed all competition between five companies which at the time controlled the greater
portion of the interstate and foreign commerce in the article, though
if they had been small companies and their combination had been
essential to enable them to compete with large companies in their
line, their uniting would not have been in restraint of trade; that
this company was from the beginning in violation of the first and
second sections of the Sherman Law.
The Sherman Act of i8go illustrates the hostility and fear that
the public entertained toward the large corporations, pools, trusts
and combinations of that time. Although entitled "An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," it was really intended to secure the freedom of engaging in
interstate and foreign commerce, for it is immaterial that the combination would increase the volume of interstate traffic and thus
benefit the public. Section One declares illegal "every contract,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations"; and further declares
that "every person who shall make any such contract, or engage in
any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," and be punished accordingly. Section Two declares
that "every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire, with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce aftiong the several states or
foreign nations" shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished
accordingly. Section Four gives the Circuit Courts-of the United
States jurisdiction to prevent and restrain the violations of this Act
by equity proceedings instituted by the several district attorneys
olf the United States. Section Seven declares that "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or
corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this Act may sue therefor in any Circuit Court of the United
States and recover threefold the damages by him sustained.",
This statute by declaring certain acts to be crimes is purely a
criminal statute but is peculiar and extraordinary in that it empowers
the courts to prevent the commission of the acts and thus the courts

'U. S. v. Northern Securities Co., x2o Fed. Rep. 721 at p. 730

(19a4).

'Under this section a purchaser who has been compelled to pay an enhanced fine brought about by an unlawful combination may recover the difference between that price and the price which would have prevailed but for
the combination. Chattanooga Foundry Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U. S.
390 (19o6); Thomson v. The Union Castle Mail S. S. Co., 149 Fed. 933 (x9o7).
See also 'Mines v. Scribner. 147 Fed. Rep. 927 (19o6); Hale v. O'Conner Coal
Some cases have gone so far as to hold that
Co.. 18i Fed. Rep. 2-67 (oo8).
where the defendant combination has refused to deal with the plaintiff he
may never recover treble damages. Ellis v. Inman Paulson & Co, 1.31 Fed.
Rep. i8a (19o4).

NOTES
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cin prevent the commission of a crime before it is committed. It
might also be observed that the courts are authorized to proceed
only by way of prevention and restraint,G yet the courts grant relief
by the affirmative decree of dissolving past acts and restoring combinations to their status quo before the agreement, transfer, or whatever brought about the combination.'
Langdell criticizes this
severely,7 claiming that such a "decree is a mere act of arbitrary
power and utterly without justification or excuse," in. referring to
the decree ordering the dissolution of the Northern Securities Company. If the courts did not adopt this method of dealing with such
combinations the statute would not be of much practical value for it
would be next to impossible to discover those about to violate the
Act, as its violation is discovered only after the act has been com-

mitted.
Under the Act, real trusts were held to be illegal in x89o and
are practically non-existent at present. Pools have also been declared
illegal,' and it was thought that if the combining parties formed a
corporation as a legal entity in itself, instead of the loosely joined
"pool" composed of a number of corporations joined by agreement
among themselves alone, the court would not apply the Act, because
a corporation being a person could not "contract" or "conspire" by
itself alone. This idea was exploded by the Northern Securities
Case, which represents the present view that it is immaterial what
form the combination takes, for "if the contract or combination does
actually produce a restraint it is void even though on its face it does
not call for such restraint." 10
Other combinations which have been attacked under this Act
may be classified as follows: (i) Cases involving combinations and
conspiracies by means of physical force or threats or boycott, to
prevent others from engaging in interstate commerce."' (2) Cases
involving contracts or combinations among railways engaged in interstate commerce to eliminate competition or to increase or prevent
a reduction of the interstate rates. 2 (3) Cases involving contracts
or combinations that merely prevent or diminish competition among
those contracting or combining, without restraining the trade of
others and without constituting a monopoly. Though literally the
'U. S. v. E. C. Knight. ix6 U. S. r at p. 17 (1895).
'U. S. v. Northern Securities Co., 193 U. S. 197 (1x94).
16 HAR%% L R. 539 (i9o2).
People v.North River Sugar Co., 12T N. Y. 582 (i8o).
'U. S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., x75 U. S. 21! (1899).
"Northern Sec. Co. v. U. S., xm3 U. S. 197 (i9o4); Gibbs v. McNeely,
118 Fed. Rep. 12o (i902).
'In

re Debs,

x58 U. S. 564 (1896); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274

(iDoS).

" U. S. v. Trans. Mo. Freight Assn., 166 U. S.29 (897) ; U. S. v. Joint
Traffic Assn.. 171 U. S. 505 (1898); Northern Securities Co. v. U. S.. z93
U. S. 9J'(19o4). For a criticism of this last case see 16 HARV. L R. 539.
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Act applies to such cases, yet it has not been so applied and covenants
in restraint of trade have been upheld and determined valid or invalid
by the common law principle whether the restraint imposed was
reasonable or not."3 An individual may make an exclusive contract
of sale of his product for a term of years and such is valid unless
the purchaser was acquiring control of the market by obtaining a
number of such contracts."' The reason given why the Act does not
apply to such cases is that it was not passed to protect individuals
against the consequences of their own acts, but to protect trade and
commerce of the community." (4) Cases involving monopolies in
the hands of individuals. The Act has never been applied to an
individual owner of a natural monopoly, that is, one created by
nature, nor to an individual patentee even though he may restrain
trade by having the monopoly of the mainufacture and sale of the
patented article," but if the restraint arise from the combination of
several natural monopolists 1T or several patentees 1 8 it will be declared void, even though literally the Act applies to both. These
exceptions like those in the third class fall in the fifth class. (5) Cases
involving combinations or conspiracies to monopolize any part of
interstate or foreign trade or commerce. Under this heading the
bulk of the important cases fall, including the Harvester Case. No
case has arisen involving any decision as to the application of the
provision of the Act to an attempt to monopolize, nor has any case
been decided on the ground of a monopoly alone as the second
section of the Act seems to indicate, but invariably the first section
is made to play an important part in the case and a "restraint of
trade or commerce" is always found. A monopoly is generally hefd
to exist when most of the selling and buying in a particular article
is in the hands of 'the. combination, so the real question seems to be
whether the combination has acquired such control of that commodity in the market that it can dictate its own terms of the buying
and selling. Every case depends on its facts and the courts will be
influenced greatly by the following: (i) The methods used in achieving the control the combinationhas. If they were unfair and improper it is likely to prejudice the court against the combination in
'Phillips v. Iola P. Cement Co.. 125 Fed. Rep. 593 (19o3); McConnel
v. Camoro McConnell Co., 152 Fed. Rep. 593 (1907); U. S. v. Amer. Tobacco
Co.. 221 U. S. io6 at P. 179 (igi): U. S. v. Trans. Mo. Freight Assn.. x66
U. S. 290 (1897).
"Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. U. S., iis Fed. Rep. 6io (igoa); U. S.
v. Reading Co., 226 U. S. 324 (912).

"1o CoL. L R. 694 (i91o);

22

HARv. L R. 499 (igog).

" Goshen Rubber Works v. Single Tube Tire Co., 166 Fed. Rep. 431

(1908).
"' U. S. v. Jellico Mt. Coal Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 432 (i8gi); Chesapeake &
Ohio Fuel Co. v. U. S. 115 Fed. Rep. 61o (,9o2).
" Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. U. S. 226 U. S. 20 (1912); Ind. Mfg. Co.
v. Machine Co. x54 Fed. Rep. 365 (i9o7).

NOTES

a close case. (2) The percentage or extent to which that control
extends. The Act would not apply to an acquisition of control of
less than fifty per cent. of the commerce in an article but has generally been applied to a control over seventy-five per cent. (3) The
presence or absence of intent to control the market. Great stress
was laid on this in the Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases." Many
previous cases considered this as immaterial 20 unless there is a close
question of fact whether there is or is not control of the market.
As every one is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts if, as in the Harvester Case, a number of persons
who already control the greater part of the market in any commodity
combine and it results in a strong control, it will be presumed that
they combined with the intent to control the market. So it might
be said that corporations, which have practically a monopoly on the
trade of any article, if such corporation is formed from previously
independent corporations, are prima facie illegal and the burden is
on them to show that the combination was for a rightful .purpose
such as to secure greater industrial efficiency, or to turn out a better
and cheaper article; that it was not for the purpose of controlling
the market; that its methods were fair and did not interfere with
the right of others to compete.21
Thus the Act has by no means been applied literally, and has not
been applied to any contract, combination or monopoly which would
not have been equally invalid in a proper proceeding under the rules
of common law, but at the common law the United States could not
as a party to a suit dissolve or in any way affect these combinations,
where the only effect would be that agreements and contracts entered
into in forming these combinations would not be enforced by the
courts. By glancing over the past well-known cases 22 connected with
this subject one can readily see the importance to the trusts of the
additional remedy given by the Act.
In applying the foregoing principles to the Harvester Case we
find that it is well in accord with previous decisions for there is
present a control of an article greater than seventy-five per cent.,
and the intent to obtain control by combining companies, which
companies deal extensively in interstate commerce. This latter element is necessary for the Act applies only where the restraint is
an Interstate or foreign trade whether it be direct or indirect, and
does not apply to restraints of trades which are intrastate, for over
the latter, Congress has no direct control.
U. S. 31 (igii); 221 U. S. io6 (igit).
"Fuel Co. v. U. S., ixis Fed. Rep. 61o at 623 (19o2); American Biscuit

29221

Co. v. Klotz, 44 Fed. Rep. 721 at 725 (i89i); Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco
Co., T23 Fed. Rep. 454 at 457 (1903).
25 HARV.L R- 31 (1911).

" The Standard Oil Trust, The American Tobacco Trust, The Ralroad

Trusts, The Adyston Pipe & Steel Trust, and The Coal Trusts.
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This control of trusts which thus affects the public by controlling
its prices, and its wages to the laborer, may be justified when it is
considered that these very trusts owe their existence to the states
which allow them to incorporate. As the public created corporations
for its own good, it should rightfully limit their functions and regulate their powers for its own good.2
Since the decision of this case, the Clayton Act was passed 2,
"to supplement the existing laws against unlawful restraints and
monopolies, and for other purposes." The same result would
have been reached under this Act, though the means might have been
different in that the motive of the combination seems to be immaterial and the degree of the monopoly created need not be so great,
for Section Seven reads: "That no corporation engaged in commerce
shall acquire directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the
stock or other share of capital of another corporation engaged
also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock
is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, -or to
restrain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to
create a monopoly of any line of commerce." It has not been decided how the words "substantially lessen competition" should be
interpreted, but it clearly gives the courts greater power and freedom for dissolving such corporations as the International Harvester
Company than did the Act of 189o.

E.H.

HOMICIDE-OPERATION OF AUTOMOBILES-A situation which
promises to be of frequent occurrence in these modern times is
where an automobilist, who is exceeding the speed limit or violating
some traffic regulation, causes the death of a pedestrian or other
occupant of the road. who may, under the circumstances, have made
the wrong move, and the automobilist is thereupon indicted for involuntary manslaughter. Mere proof that he did an act which is
prohibited by statute or valid ordinance will subject him to punishment for doing that act.' If he has been guilty of gross negligence
in the operation of his automobile and that gross negligence is the
cause of another death, he is guilty of manslaughter, regardless of
violation of any statutory requirement. 2 The interesting case arises
where, although violating a speed law, the automobile operator is

$ For some valuable sources of information on this subject see 62 U. o

P. L R. 73, x61, 241 (1914); 6o U. or P. L. R. 3r! (1912); x6 HARv. L R.
79, 539 (1902); 22 HARV. L R. 492 (xo9); 23 HARV. L. P 353 (1910); 25
HARV. L R. 31 (1911); 17 HAv. L R. s33 (1904); 12 CL. L. R. 45o (9zgu).
"October 1m, x914.

J.

'Commonwealth v. Weiss,

139

Pa. 247 (i8go); Holstead v. State, 4T N.

o2
6o1.o8,9).
•State v. Goetz. 76 AtL Rep. zooo (Conn. igio).
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not guilty of gross negligence. Involuntary manslaughter is homicide in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, or homicide caused by grossly negligent conduct of a lawful act.
Where the automobilist cannot be held on the ground of negligence
can he be held for homicide in the commission of an unlawful act,
not amounting to a felony? Is violation of a speed or traffic law,
an "unlawful act, not amounting to a felony," within the meaning of
the definition of manslaughter?
Older cases are almost unanimous in holding that an act to be
unlawful in that sense, must be one malum in se and not merely malun prohibitum. The leading case on the subject is Commonwealth
v. Adains,3 which is concerned with the violation of an ordinance
limiting the speed of horses and carriages, and the driver was sought
to be held for assault and battery in injuring a person on the highway. The court in that case held that to convict of a crime, criminal
intent must be shown or construed. Where an act considered evil
by civilization has been committed, the criminal intent necessary to
that act may be constructively applied to all the results of that crime.
But, unless the crime sought to be punished is statutory, there must
be a criminal intent. Since one is guilty of a statutory crime, irrespective of any intent, but on mere proof that the terms of the statute
have not been followed, there is no criminal intent and can be no
constructive intent to commit some other crime. The same principle has been adhered to in the case of accidental homicide by a
person hunting on another's land without written permit from the
owner, in violation of a statute,4 and in the case of one carrying
concealed deadly weapons contrary to statute and killing another by
the accidental discharge of the pistol so carried.5 An Alabama case 6
seems to hold a contrary view, and a Kentucky caseT had valid
grounds for the result, although basing the decision on homicide in
commission of violation of ordinance.'
Were the reasoning of these cases to be adopted as automobile
cases arise, the result should be that proof of violation of a speed
law is not sufficient to constitute homicide by a speeding motorist
manslaughter. Of course, this does not absolve the driver from
responsibility, .for he may still be guilty of gross negligence and liable
for manslaughter by reason of homicide caused by grossly negligent
conduct. The relation between these two branches of manslaughter

Mass. 323 (1873).
State v. Horton, z39 N. C. 588 (9o5), "mala in se, acts naturally evil as
adjudged by the sense of a civilized community."
'Potter v. State, 16z Md. 213 (1903).
• Thompson v. State, 131 Ala. i8 (rgor). "Court properly refused to charge
that when defendant was unlawfully racing, be must as well have been reckless, furious and grossly negligent in his driving."
'Sparks v. Commonwealth, 3 Bush. iii (Ky. 1867). Defendant defiant
of ordinance drew pistol and brandished it, -while in presence of three others,
intending to fire it in the air.
114
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was shown by the recent case of People v. Barnes. It is true that
in that case that the court held that the killing was not the proximate cause of the violation of the speed law, but the language of
the court on the arbitrary nature of a speed limit and the lack of
criminality in violating it indicate that if the case hinged on the
point of manslaughter in commission of an act malum prohibilum
only, the rule of Coinnionuealth v. Adams would be followed.
Another point in the case and, in the light of the usual wording of
present day speed limit laws, perhaps the most important point is the
rule that violation of the statute is not in itself conclusive of gross
negligence to convict of manslaughter in negligent conduct in a
lawful act. The two crimes of the same name are separate and distinct and one cannot prove the other.' The true function of the
statute providing a speed limit in any action but for punishment for
violation of the statute is as evidence of negligence, and rebuttable
evidence." A speed limit is the legislative expression of the ultimate
of careful driving and should be introduced as a standard, provided
that the defendant may show that upon the particular occasion in
question, a greater speed could be maintained without any probable
risk." This is especially the case where the statute provides that
the maintenance of a certain speed shall be considered prima facie
negligence.u2 But in this use of the statute the liability of the defendant is on account of his gross negligence and not by reason of
his violation of the statute.
Even supposing that courts will decide as others are convinced
they should decide, it would be impossible to lay down a general
rule as to liability for violation of speed limit statutes. There are
two important factors which enter the case, which make uniformity
impossible; they are different views as to the degree of negligence
necessary to conviction for manslaughter and the diversity of speed
statutes. To revert to the terms considered by some courts merely
academic. namely, malum prohibitin and inolum in se. it is easily
conceivable that a thing inaluin in se but hitherto unpunisbable, may
by statute become punishable, and it will nevertheless be malum in
se. despite the fact of its being an act malum prohibitum; and homicide committed in violation of such statute will be manslaughter.
In fact, some states have no crimes save statutory ones.1s If viola148 N. NV. Rep. 4oo (Mich. '914).

'Clark and Marshall's Criminal Law (3rd ed.), §262. "Involuntary man-

slaughter may be by () malfeasance; (2) misfeasance, and (3) nonfeasance.*
"State v. Campbell. 74 At. Rep. 927 (Conn. igo) ; Schultz v. State. 130
N. NV. Rep. 972 (Neb. 19ii), often cited as contra to Commonwealth v.
Adams. but it is believed improperly so cited; Commonwealth v. Hawkins,
'57 Mass. 551 (1893).
' Cases cited in n. zo, supra.
, As in Vermont, Massachusetts, et aL
"Ohio v. Collir.gsworth. 92 .X. E. Rep. 22 (Ohio, 191o).

NOTES

tion of a speed regulation involves commission of an act m lum in se
(and statutes have been framed in such words), clearly homicide in
violation of the statute could be held manslaughter without controverting the principle of Coon
nwwealth v. Adarns. Again in jurisdictions where only a slight degree of negligence will support a
prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, a statute declaring a certain rate of speed negligent driving would be conclusive as to the
gross negligence, while a statute making a certain rate of speed prima
facie negligence, would be very strong evidence. All of which is
true provided only the courts do not establish a system of automobile
law apart from the general law of the land.
.F.H.
INFANTs-LIABILITY FOR FRAUDULENT 'MISREPRESENTATION OF

AGE-The settled policy of the law to shield infants from the consequences of contracts made before they have attained the maturity
attendant upon becoming of age, frequently conflicts with the duty
of the courts to afford a remedy to defrauded persons. It was early
recognized, and now universally realized, that the protection, extended because of the reputed ignorance, lack of discretion and inexperience of mankind during legal infancy, "must be used as a shield
and not as a sword."' Such a realization, however, has not resulted
in the universal enunciation or adoption of principles to be applied
where the conflict occurs. One of the most troublesome situations,
in this branch of the law, arises where an adult is induced to contract
with an infant by reason of the latter's misrepresentation of his age.

"A multitude of undistinguishable distinctions"2 has been made in
order to reconcile policy and substantial justice. In a recent case,2
the English Court of Appeals, believing that it was "necessary to
safeguard the weakness of infants at large, even though here and
there a juvenile rogue slipped through," refused to allow a recovery
either in deceit, quasi contract, or equity by the plaintiff, a money
lender, who, in reliance upon the defendant's fraudulent representation that he had reached his majority, had lent him four hundred
pounds which had been expended for non-necessaries.
. As long ago as x665," it was decided, and it is now held in
England 5 and in many American jurisdictions, that, although, as a
general rule, an infant is liable for his torts, he is not answerable
'Jennings v. Rundall, 8 T. R. 335 (Eng. 1799) ; per Lord Kenyon.
'Commander Y. Brazil, 88 Miss. 668 (x9o6), per Calhoun, J.
*R.Leslie Limited, iii Law Times, io6 (19T4).
'Johnson v. Pie, i Sid. 258.

'Liverpool, etc., Assoc. v. Fairhurst, 9 Ex. 422 (Eng. 1854).
' Brooks v. Sawyer, x9 Mass. isi ('9o6); Monumental Building Assoc.
v. Herman. 33 Md. 128 (1870); Kean v. Coleman, 39 Pa. 29 (i86t); Nash
v. Jewett, 61 Vt. 5o (x8g9).
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in deceit for his fraudulent misrepresentation of age, which is
the inducement of a contract. The reason is that the tort is not
independent of the contract and that to allow a recovery in deceit
would amount to enforcing the contract indirectly. An early American case,' which has been extensively followed,3 allowe such a
recovery, on the ground that the deceit was antecedent to the making
of the contract. It is conceived, however, that the deceit is coincident with the formation of the contract, for the reason that the act,
indicating reliance upon the fraudulent misrepresentations, which

is a necessary element of actionable fraud, also completes the

contract.

A person, who has made a contract in reliance upon a minor's
false statement that he was of full age, may avoid it,' even before
the time set for performance by the latter, 0 and recover in specie
whatever the infant acquired under it, provided that it is still in his
possession at the time of the rescission; or its value, if he disposes
of it, after notice of avoidance has been given." But, by the weight
of authority, an infant is not required to return the consideration
received by him as a condition precedent to avoiding his contract or
to interposing successfully a plea of infancy in an action against him
to enforce it.' 2 However, if after disaffirmance, he retains the consideration, title is held to be re-vested in the other party, who may
bring replevin or trover to recover it,"s even from a third person. "
If the infant does not restore the consideration in his possession, he
cannot compel restitution.s But if, at the time of disaffirmance by
either party, the infant has wasted or disposed of the consideration
he is not required to make compensation for its value.* Property,
received by the infant from a third person in exchange for property
obtained under the contract which has been avoided, -cannot be re' Fitts v. Hall, 9 N. H. 441 (1838).
v. Boyer, to8 Ind. 472 (1886); Eckstein v. Frank, z Daly, 334
*Rite
(N. Y. t863).
"Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359 (1819); Nolan v. Jones, s3 I.

(i8'o); Robinson v. Berry, 93 Me. 32o (i899).
" Badger v. Phinney, supra, . 9.

587

"Shaw v. Coffin, 0 Me. 254 (1870) ; Elwell v. Martin, 32 Vt. 217 (185).
" Shipley v. Smith, 162 Ind. 526 (19o4); Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass.
5o8 (1867) ; Craighhead v. Wells, 21 Mo. 404 (1855).
" Strain v. Wright, 7 Ga. 568 (1849). By a fiction that the law can imply
a promise which an infant cannot avoid, a quasi-contractual action will lie,
if the cause of action arose ex dclicto. Cowern v. Nield (19T2), 2 K. B. 419.
41&
"Neff v. Landis, 'ro Pa. 204 (i885).
'Holmes v. Blogg. 8 Taunt. 5o8 (Eng. 1878) ; Johnson v. Northwestern,
etc., Co.. .6 Minn. 365 o894): contra, Morse v. Ely. 154 Mass. 458 (891);
Green v. Green, 6j N. Y. 5s3 (877).
" Neilson v. International, etc.. Co., io6 Me. 1o4 (19o9) ; Lake v. Perry.
95 Miss. 550 (1909).

MOTES

covered by the person who contracted with the infant. 1 Where part
of the money lent has been expended for necessaries, the infant is
bound to repay to the lender the value of the necessaries so obtained-"
It is a general rule that an infant is not estopped by his fraud
to set up infancy as a defence, or even in suing to recover consideration after disaffirmance by him." However, some courts ' hold
the view that, if the deception arises, not merely from passive concealment of age, but from an actual fraudulent misrepresentation,
upon which the other party relies and is deceived, the infant will be
estopped to defend on the ground of infancy. It is clear that the
latter courts are in effect validating the infant's cofitract. Where
an infant requires the affirmative assistance of a court of equity, the
doctrine of unclean hands applies and generally he -will not be aided,
unless he is prepared to do equity. Thus, where an infant by fraudulently misrepresenting his age, obtains from his trustee money due
at his majority, he cannot compel the trustee to make another payment when he actually reaches twenty-one.' 1 So, also, where an
infant, by representing that he is at full age, induces the purchase
of land belonging to him, he will be estopped to disaffirm the sale
and to have his conveyance set aside by a court of equity."2 The
court in the principal case summarized the rule in equity as follows:"8
"When an infant obtained an advantage by falsely stating himself
to be of full age. equity required him to restore his ill-gotten gains,
or to release the party deceived from obligations or act in law induced bv the fraud but scrupulously stopped short of enforcing
against him a contractual obligation entered into while he was an
infant even by means of a fraud." This principle is well illustrated
in a case 2 ' where an infant fraudulently obtained promissory notes.
He was required to restore them but a decree to pay their amount
was refused. Similarly, where an infant obtained a lease of prop-.
"W,alsh v. Powers. 43 N. Y. 2.1 (i87o); contra. Stocks v. Wilson (1913),
K. B. 235. The latter case is practically overruled by the decision in the
principal case.
" Featherstone v. Betlejewski, 75 "*. App. 59 0897) ; Bedinger v. Wharton. 27 Gratt. 857 Va. (z876); contra, Stull v. Harris, 5t Ark 294 (t888);
Price v. Sanders. 6o nd. 310 (1878). "
"Tobin v. Spann, 85 Ark. 56 (rgo8) ; Sims v. Everhardt, io2 U. S. 30w
(88o); Ledger. etc.. Assoc. v. Cook, 6 W. N. C. 428 (Pa T879).
2

" Davidson v. Young. 39 II1. x4. (z8go); Cobbey v. Buchanan. 48 Neb.
391 (r8g6).
2Cory v. Geitken, 2 Madd. 40 (Eng. 1816). Where an infant falsely
declared he was of age and induced a settlement with his guardian, a court
of equity refused to set aside the settlement. Hayes v. Barker, 41 N. J. Eq.

630 (1886).

I Ryan v. Grouny. x25 Mo. 474 (x894) ; contra, even though the infant's
grantee had.conveyed to a t..ird person. Buchanan v. Hubbard, 96 Ind.

1 (188g).
sP.

ITO.

Clarke v. Cohley,

2

Cox, 173 (Eng. 1789).

326

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

erty, by misstating his age, he was required to give up the property,
but not to pay for its use and occupation.'
The effect of the principal case in England is to allow the party
defrauded by the infant to recover the property, surrendered in consequence of the contract, provided that it is still in the possession of
the infant. The court specifically says2' that there is no liability to
account, since there is no fiduciary relation, and refuses to give a
judgment in personam to pay an equivalent sum out of his present
or future resources. It is probable that the effect of the principal
case will be the abolishment of the present rule -7 in England, that
if upon the bankruptcy of an infant, there be a claim arising out of
a transaction, identical with the principal case, a sum is recoverable
out of his estate, even though it is impossible to trace the specific
funds borrowed. It is submitted that the result of the decision under
discussion is inequitable and an undue hardship upon the plaintiff,
whose sole remedy is to bring criminal prosecution for obtaining
money under false pretenses.28 Most courts in the United States
have given similar immunity to infants, out of consideration for
youthful improvidence in general. However, there is a not'ceable
tendency to deal with an infant's fraud, though connected with a
contract, as with the fraudulent acts of adults. 2 ' The following
extracts from a decision 31 which has taken the broadest view of
the situation, is an excellent statement of a principle which, it is
submitted, might w.-ll be universally adopted: "When a minor whose
appearance justifies belief in such a statement induces a contract,
which is reasonable, by false assurances that he is of the age of
majority, he should be, and is estopped to repudiate it, and should
be compelled to carry it out or to fully restore status quo, by returning what he got and making compensation if he has wasted it."
4A.L.L.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-PROSTITrION.-VHITE SLAVE AcTThe Act of Congress known as the WVhite Slave Act I prohibits the
interstate transportation of a woman or girl "for the purpose of
Lemprire v. Lange, 12 Ch. Div. 675 (i8f).
tP. 1IO.

FEr parte Unity Bank; Re King. 3 De G. & J. 63 (Eng. 1858).
Com. v. Ferguson, 121 S. AV. Rep. (Ky. z9og).
"Pemberton, etc., Assoc. v. Adams. s3 X. J. Eq. 258 (i895), reaclied a
conclusion contrary to the principal case, under precisely identical facts. See
also Ferguson v. Bobo, 154 Miss. 121 (18-6); Benedetto v. Holden, 21 Grant.
Ch. 2.2 (Ont. 1894). Statutes- have been passed in some states providing
that an infant cannot disaffirm a.cantract induced by his misrepresentation as
to his age. Ia. Code, §3190; Kan. Gen. Stat, §4184; Wash. Gen. Stat., §4582.
M Commander v. Brazil, supra,". 2.
' Act of June 25 i9io, c. 395, 36 Stat. 825, U. S. Comp. St. Supp. x91l, p.
1343. which provides in part:

"That any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be trans-

NOTES

prostitution or debauchery or any other immoral purpose." In a
prosecution for violating the White Slave Act, the Circuit Court of
Appeals held that while the term "prostitution" involves the financial element and signifies commercialized vice, the words "other
immoral purpose" as used in the statute are not limited to kindred
offenses involving the sharing of profits by the hire of the woman's
body, and hence their meaning was fulfilled by sexual intercourse
between the female and the defendant involving no financial gain.$
The constitutionality of the Mann Act was settled beyond debate
in the first White Slave Case.3 The United State Supreme Court
adopted the view that the interstate transportation of persons and
the interstate transportation of things rests upon the same power of
Congress; that the power of Congress to regulate each is identical
both as to its source and its extent. It follows, therefore, that if
Congress can prohibit the interstate transportation of things because
the common interests require it, Congress may also prolubit the
interstate transportation of women and girls for immoral purposes, if in the judgment of Congress, the common interests
require it.' Mr. Justice McKenna, in the case of Hoke v. United
States,5 speaking for a unanimous court, in sustaining the White
Slave Act used this language: "And surely, if the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away from the demoralization of
lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons, the impurity of foods or drugs, the like
facility can be taken away from the systematic enticement to and the
enslavement in prostitution and debauchery of women, and, more
insistently of girls."
The only question, then, on which doubt might be entertained,
is whether the interstate transportation of a woman or girl for the
purpose of having sexual intercourse with her is an immoral purpose within the meaning of the statute. It was argued, in the principal case, that the words "prostitution or debauchery or any other
immoral purpose" do not cover sexual intercourse and that the person who furnishes the transportation cannot be found guilty under
ported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in"transporting,

in interstate or foreign commerce, . . . any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, . . .
or who shall knowingly procure or obtain, or cause to be procured or obtained,
or aid or assist in procuring or obtaining any ticket or tickets, or any form
of transportation or evidence of the right thercto, to be used by any woman
or girl in interstate or foreign commerce, . . . in going to any place for
the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose,
. . . whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in interstate or
ioreign commerce, . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony, etc."
'Johnson v. United States, 2is Fed. Rep. 679 (t914).
'Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 3o9 (19x3).
*Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283 (U. S. 1849); Lottery Cases, x88 U. S.
321 (,io2); Bennett v. United States, z94 Fed. Rep. 631 (1912).

"Supra, n. 3.
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the Act unless he. shares in or somehow profits by the hire of the
woman's body. All will admit that full effect must be given to the
intention of Congress as gathered from the words of the statute.

There can be no doubt as to what class was aimed at by the clause
forbidding the interstate transportation of women or girls for purposes of "prostitution." It refers to women who for hire offer their
bodies to indiscriminate intercourse with men.' "Debauchery," the
other named species, is restricted by its association with the first
species to sexual debauchery-a leading of a chaste girl into unchastity. No financial element is necessarily involved in sexual
debauchery. Now, the addition of the words, "or for any other
immoral purpose," after the word "debauchery" must have been
made for some practical object. Those added words would seem
to show that Congress had in view the protection of society against
a class of women other than those who might be brought in the state
for purposes of prostitution or debauchery. (In forbidding the interstate transportation of women "for .any oThler immoral purpose,"
Congress evidently thought that there were purposes in connection
with the transportation of women, which as in the case of transpQrtation for prostitution or debauchery, were to be deemed immoral)
It may be admitted that in accordance with the rule of ejusdem
yencris, the immoral purpose referred to by the words "any other
immoral purpose," must be of the same general class or kind as the
particular purpose of prostitution or debauchery specified in the same
clause of the statute.' and it would seem that the immoral purpose
for which the defendant was convicted in the principal case is of
the same general class or kind as the one that controls in the transportation of xomn or girls for the purpose of prostitution or
debauchery."k_\e must assume that in using the words "for any
other immoral purpose," Congress had reference to the views commonly entertained among the people of the United States as to
what is moral or immoral in the relations between man and woman
in the matter of sexual intercourse: Those views may not be overlooked in determining questions involving the morality or immorality
of sexual intercourse between particular persons.10 In United States
v. IJ'ittbergcr," Chief Justice Marshall said that "though penal laws
are to be onstrued strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly
as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. The maxim
is not to be applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the
exclusion of cases, which those words, in their ordinary acceptation,
*'United States v. Hoke, t87 Fed. Rep. 992 (i9ut).
'Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U. S. 327 (1913).
82 Lewis Sunderland Stat. Const., §423.
*United States v. Flaspoller. --o8 Fed. Rep. 1007 (1913) ; Suslak v. United

States. 213 Fed. Rep. 913 (1914).
"United States v. BittY; 28 U. S. 393 (1907). •
"United States v. Wilteeyer. 5 Wheat. 76 (U. S. 1820).
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or in that sense in which the legislature has obviously used them,
would comprehend. The intention of the legislature is to be colThe case must be a
.
lected from the words they employ.
strong one indeed, which would justify a court in departing from
the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of
an intention which the words themselves did not suggest."
The small amount of authority does not present any very satis,factory solution of the problem, but it seems clear that "commercialized vice" or "the traffic in women for gain" is not the common
ground, that the attribute in common indicative of the genus is

sexual immorality, and that fornication and adultery are species of
that genus. This conclusion is fortified by the case of United States
v. Bitty.": The Supreme Court in construing the prohibition of the
Immigration Act against the importation of alien women "for the
purposc of prostitution or any other immoral purpose," held that the
latter phrase meantcunlawful sexual intercourse regardless of financial considerations) And Mfr. Justice McKenna in a very recent
decision ,1 announced the view that the White Slave Act of i9o
was designed to reach acts which might ultimately lead to that
phase of debauchery which consisted in sexual actions.
It is manifest that the Act does not undertake to prohibit the
woman from traveling from one state to another of her own volition,
and in the supposed exercise of her inherent personal rights, no
matter what her purpose as to her future conduct may be. (The
primary thing forbidden is the inducing of the person to come into
the state with unlawful purpose and in aid of such unlawful purpose.1 4) So, in W'ilson v. United States,15 the offense denounced by
the White Slave Act was held to be complete when the transportation
in interstate commerce was accomplished. There is no locus penitentiae thereaftern

G.W.K.
SALES-NATURE OF TI! E RIGHT OF INSPECTION-It is universally
admitted by courts and text writers that in a sale one of the obligations of the seller is to allow the buyer a right of inspection. We
find in the books elaborate consideration and comparative unanimity of opinion on the questions of time and place and expense.
of inspection, and the extent to which the buyer is entitled to
destroy the goods in making his inspection, but the authorities are
singularly silent concerning the nature of the right, to what it
relates, and what is the effect on the rights of the parties when

*Supra, n. io.
1 Athanasaw v. United States, suPra, n. 6.
"Bennett v. United States, 221 U. S. 333 (1913).
234 U. S. 347 (1914).
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the buyer is deprived of it.' It should be obvious that there can be
no such thing as a right of inspection in the abstract, and if it exists
at all it must exist in relation to the other obligations of buyer and
seller, and the remedy for the buyer when he is deprived of it must
conform to the other rules of sale. It is submitted that the conception of inspection as a condition precedent to the payment of the
price and as having no direct relation to the passage of title will not
only be in accord with the actual decisions on the subject, but will
be found to be the only conception which logically conforms to the
other rules of sales law concerning the passage of title. The cases
wherein -inspection is important fall naturally into four groups
which will be considered in order:2 (i) Executed sales; (2) sales
executory at the outset, but which are to become executed before
delivery; (3) sales wholly executory; (4) sales by acceptance of

the goods.
i. An executed sale.is one in which title passes to the buyer on
the making of the contract, as in the case of specific goods to which
nothing remains to be done.' At the time of delivery of these goods
the buyer must "have an opportunity offered him, before he is
called upon to part with his money, of seeing that" the goods "presented for his acceptance are in reality those for which he bargained."' By hypothesis, title to some goods passed on the making
of the contract, and the buyer may inspect solely to determine
whether the goods tendered are in fact those to which title has passed
to him; if they are, he must take them and becomes immediately
liable for the price; if they are not, the case comes under group four,
which will be considered later. Thus it is impossible in sucIf a case
to say that the inspection has any relation to the passage of title;
the inspection is however made a condition precedent to the payment of the price, because, although it would be possible for the
law to take the position that the buyer must pay for the goods on
delivery without inspection and can recover back the price if they
are not his goods, yet it is more equitable to allow him an inspection first, rather than to make him pay first and take the chance
that the goods tendered may not be his.
If the goods have been accidentally destroyed before delivery,
the loss must fall on the buyer since title is in him and risk of loss
'Mechem on Sales. §121t. Tiffany on Sales, §toy. Burdick on Sales,
§z97- Benjamin on Sales, p. 74o.
Professor Williston seems to be the only writer who realizes the unsatisfactory state of the authorities on this subject and he endeavors to correlate
the right of inspection with the other rules of sales law by saying that it may
be a condition precedent to the passage of title, to the payment of the price,
or a condition subsequent. Williston on Sales, §471.
'This classification cannot include all. the special contracts which the
parties may make concerning inspection, but it is thought to cover all situations which can arise in the absence of express contract.
*Tarling v. Baxter. 6 B. & C. .36o (Eng. 1827).
'Isherwood v. Whitmore, itM. & NV. 347 (Eng. 1843).
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follows title;' and in an action to recover the purchase price, the
seller need not prove that an opportunity for inspection was offered,
but he must prove the equivalent thereof, namely that the goods lost
were actually the goods to which title had passed to the buyer.*
Thus though the right of inspection has been lost, it is sb lost because
the only reason of its existence is to protect the buyer from paying
his money for goods which may not be his, and when the goods are
lost and inspection becomes impossible, the buyer is amply protected
by the requirement that the seller must prove that the goods lost
were the buyer's before he can recover the price.
2. If a quantity of unascertained goods are ordered, although
no title can pass to the buyer on the making of the contract, yet
by an appropriation and previous assent thereto by the buyer title
will pass before actual delivery, provided the appropriation by the
seller was in exact conformity with the contract and the goods
appropriated fulfil all the conditions of the contract.? Consequently
in considering the right of the buyer to inspect in such a case, it is
essential first to determine whether title to the goods was in the
buyer or seller, which in turn depends upon whether the goods conformed to the contract in every particular. This decided, the same
rules of inspection apply as in the case of an exectued sale; the buyer
may inspect to see whether the goods are his goods, i. e., whether
they conform to the conditions of sale; if so, he must keep them and
pay the price; if not, he may reject and is never liable at all.
The substance of the right of inspection in this case is the same
as in the case of an executed sale, although the application of it may
be somewhat different. For example, if the parties at the time of
the making of the contract have before them the goods to be sold,
it is unlikely that there will be any conditions or implied warranties
annexed to the sale, and the one condition is that the goods delivered shall be the identical goods sold. Hence the buyer may inspect
only to determine whether this one condition has been complied
with. But when the sale is by sample or the parties are dealing at
a distance, there will usually arise conditions and implied warranties
of merchantability, equality to sample, fitness for a particular use,
etc., and unless these conditions are complied with, irrespective of
appropriation and assent, no title will pass.' The inspection in such
a case, to determine whether all the conditions have been complied
with, will necessarily be of a far more detailed character than that
'McNeil v. Braun. 53 N. J. L. 617 089); Joyce v. Adams. 8 N. Y. 291

(x853).

'Skinner v. Griffiths, 141 Pac. Rep. 693 (Wash. i914).
'The most frequent example of this class of case is when goods are
ordered by the buyer, to be shipped to him. The appropriation is found in
the delivery to the carrier and the assent in the buyer's order to ship. Title
therefore passes on delivery to the carrier. Smith v. Edwards, r56 Mass.
221 (1Sg2).
'Giffen v. Selma Fruit Co., 5 Cal. App. So (,9o7).
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required to determine merely whether the goods delivered are the
actual goods bought. In either case, however, the purpose of inspection is the same--to enable the buyer to see for himself that the goods
delivered are in fact his goods, and the reason that the number of
conditions and implied warranties which the law according to the
circumstances of the making of the contract has annexed to the
sale determine the minuteness of the inspection which may be made,
is because on the performance of these conditions depends the
passage of title, and the inspection is allowed for the sole purpose
of determining whether title has passed.
3. In the two classes of cases just considered, the buyer has by
the terms of his contract indicated his willingness -that title to the
goods should vest in him without further action on his part;
according to the contract and the nature of the goods it might vest
in him at once or after appropriation or delivery to a common
carrier, but in any event, if the conditions of the. sale have been
complied with, the buyer cannot deny that title is in him. It- is quite
possible, however, for the sale to be wholly executory,' to -be merely
a contract by the buyer that on some future occasion he will take
title. W\'hen the time arrives and the seller tenders the goods in
conformity to the contract, it is the duty of the buyer to accept them
and take title, but unless the contract can be specifically enforced,
title cannot be forced upon a man without his consent," and, even
if the refusal of the buyer to accept is wrongful, it is not within the
power of the seller by his own act to pass title to him, nor can an
action be maintained for the purchase price, because such an action
must be predicated upon the passage of title. If the buyer accepts
the goods, title passes by that acceptance and the seller may recover
the price; if he wrongfully refuses to accept, the sole remedy of the
seller is an action for breach of the contract to buy; if he rightfully
refuses to accept, the seller has no remedy.
'The sale of unspecified goods is wholly executory unless there has been
an assent to the appropriation in advance of delivery, because an appropriation alone without such assent will not be sufficient to pass title. Johnson v.
Hunt, i Wend. 135 (N. Y. 1834); Atkinson v. Bell, 8 B. & C. 27 (Eng.
Ia8).

"This is in accord with the common law rule, as represented by Atkinson v. Bell, supra, and followed in many American courts. The rule of
Bement v. Smith, Ts Wend. 493 (N. Y. 1836), that a seller may recover
the price when the buyer has wrongfully refused to accept the title to the
goods, is confra, and there is much authority in support of this view. So
illogical a departure from common law principles, however, can only be
justified by weighty practical considerations, which cannot be discovered to
support the rule of Bement v. Smith. The remedy for the seller of resale
and action for the difference between the contract price and the amount
realized on the resale should amply protect him.
If the rule of Bement v. Smith be adopted, the inspection would be a
condition precedent to an action for the price, because the rule predicates the
action for the price on the wrongful refusal of the buyer to receive the
goods, and the refusal could never be wrongful unless an opportunity for
inspection was afforded.

NOTES

Since the buyer may, after inspection, refuse to accept the goods
even when they fulfil all the required conditions (though in so doing
he may render himself liable for damages), and since his liability to
pay the price is dependent upon his acceptance of the goods and the
consequential passage of title to him, it follows that in this case
inspection cannot be either a condition precedent to the passage of
title, nor to the payment of the price. The only result of the denial
of an opportunity of inspection is to prevent the buyer's refusal
to accept from being wrongful, because the law will not require him
to accept and take title to goods without an opportunity to see
what the goods are. The inspection in this case, therefore, is no
more than a condition precedent to an action by the seller for breach
of the contract to buy, because this action is based on the wrongful
refusal of the buyer to accept, and unless inspection has been allowed
him, his refusal is not wrongful.
4. No matter what may have been the terms of the contract of
sale, if the goods delivered by the seller do not fulfil all the conditions of the contract the title remains in the seller at least until
delivery. The contract cannot be effective to pass title to the buyer
because the conditions upon which he had agreed that title should
vest in him have not been fulfilled." Since title passes, if at all, by
acceptance of the goods, a "sale by acceptance of the goods" would
seem an appropriate designation for a transaction of this sort. If
the goods sent do not fulfil the conditions of the contract of sale
and are destroyed before delivery, the buyer cannot be made to
pay;' this, however, is not because he has had no opportunity to
inspect but because he only bears the risk of loss of his own goods
and unless the seller can prove that the goods lost were what the contract required they were not his goods. If the goods reach the buyer
lie may of course reject them. 3 But if lie accepts them he will be
taken to have waived the breach of condition and will be liable for
the price.1 4 The importance of inspection here lies in the fact that
no acceptance will be presumed until the buyer has made an actual
u

This proposition could hardly be disputed if the goods sent differed

substantially from those ordered. Thus if cigars were ordered and playing
cards sent by the seller, it could hardly be contended that title to the play-

ing cards during transit was in the buyer. And there should be no difference

if one brand of cigars was ordered and another sent, or if the goods sent
were not merchantable, or were not equal to sample. If the breach of condition is such that the buyer would have the right to reject after inspection,
it must be because the effect of the breach was to prevent any title passing
to him on shipment. It has never been held that the buyer must pay for
goods which were not shipped in conformity with the contract and which
were lost in transit Yet if title were in him, it necessarily follows that he
should pay. The suggestions obiter in some of the cases, as Magee v. Billingslcy, 3 Ala. 679, p. 698 (r42). that the title is in the buyer, subject to his
right to return the goods after inspection. cannot be accepted as sound.
"Magee v. Billingsley, 3 Ala. 679 (1842).
Pope v. Allis, 15 U. S. 363 (x885).
"Gaylord Mfg. Co. v. Allen, 53 N. Y. SiS (1873).
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inspection or a reasonable time for inspection has elapsed.15 Title
which until then has been in the seller will at the moment of acceptance pass to the buyer, and at that moment arises his liability to pay
the price; there can be no acceptance or waiver of a condition broken
until there is knowledge of the breach, and this can only be ascertained by inspection. That it is the acceptance and not the inspection that determines the passage of title is conclusively demonstrated
by the consideration that after inspection the buyer may at his
pleasure accept or reject the goods; if he rejects, title never vests
in him; therefore, if he accepts, title must vest by virtue, not of the
inspection, but of the acceptance.
It is thought that the four groups of cases considered above
include any case in which the right of inspection is important," and,
if the conclusions therein reached are correct, the following rules
concerning the nature of the right of inspection may be deduced:
x. Inspection has never any direct relation to the passage of
title.
2. When title has passed to the buyer before delivery, an opportunity for inspection is a condition precedent to the payment of the
price, except when without negligence on the part of the seller the
goods have been destroyed before delivery.
3- If for any reason an acceptance of the goods by the buyer
is necessary, no. acceptance will be required of him nor will it be
presumed against him unless he has inspected or has had an opportunity to inspect.
Mr. Williston suggests ITcases in which inspection may be a
condition precedent to the passage of title. These cases are substantially those discussed supra under group three, when the contract is
wholly executory and an assent by the buyer is required at delivery
before title will pass to him. Mr. Williston says, "The buyer is
entitled to examine the goods in order to decide- whether he will
become owner, and until the examination is completed or waived the
property will not pass." This is true, but if the examination were
in fact a condition precedent to the passage of title, on the performance of the condition by the seller allowing an opportunity for
inspection title would ipso facto pass. But this is not correct, for,
as Mr. Williston himself says, "If the property in the goods has
" McNiel v. Braun, 53 N.J. L 611 (1891).
'The right of inspection is in no way affected by the presence or absence
of an express warranty in the contract of sale. because the warranty is
considered as collateral to the main contract. Even if on inspection the
goods are "discovered to be not in conformity to the warranty, this has no
effect on the passage of title, but only gives the buyer a right to an action
for damages for breach of warranty. He must keep the goods at all events.
The right of inspection cannot be affected by the presence of an express
warranty which, even if not complied with, will not enable the buyer to return
the goods.

"'Williston on Sales, §472.

NOTES
not passed prior to inspection, it follows that after inspection the
buyer may refuse to take title." Hence it must be that the acceptantce determines the passage of title, and the true rule should be
that no acceptance is required of the buyer, and a refusal to accept:
is not wrongful unless he has been given an opportunity to inspect.
The same writer Is argues that when the goods are paid for without opportunity for inspection, as by a purchase of a bill of lading,
title may pass subject to inspection as a condition subsequent enabling
the buyer to return the goods and revest title in the seller if they
do not fulfil the conditions of sale. His argument is based on the
idea that by payment the title passed, since that was the intent of
the parties. But though this would undoubtedly be true if the
goods shipped conformed to the contract, yet if they did not conform, title to something he never intended to buy cannot logically
be said to have passed to the buyer, and it would be most inequitable
to compel him to bear the loss of something totally different from
that which he had intended to buy and for which he thought he had
paid. The mere purchase of a bill of lading ought not to vest title
to the goods in the buyer unless the goods conform to the contract
under which the bill of lading was purchased. The effect of discovery, on inspection, of a breach of a condition should be to show
that title had never passed to the buyer rather than to enable him
to revest it in the seller, and the right of the buyer to return the
goods should be based on the fact that owing to their not conforming
to the contract they are not his goods.
The recent case of Skinner v. James Griffiths & Sons's is an

excellent example of a case where title passed and an action for
the price was allowed when goods had been delivered at the place
agreed upon, but had been accidentally destroyed before the buyer
had had an opportunity to inspect. It was held that upon proof that
the goods as shipped conformed to the contract the seller might
recover the price although there had been no inspection. "The buyer
has a reasonable time after the delivery in which to examine the
goods, and, if they are not of the kind and quality ordered, he may
refuse to accept them, but this right does not prevent the title from
passing nor a recovery by the seller for goods sold and delivered
if in fact they do conform to the terms of the contract.""
T. R., Jr.
u'Id., §474.
" z41 Pac. Rep. 693 (Wash. i914).
Id., Gose, J., at p. 694.

